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―… evidence that variables that predict future cash flows also predict returns does 
not, by itself, help us determine how much variation in expected returns is caused 
by risk and how much is caused by mispricing.‖  
Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (2008, p. 1676): Dissecting anomalies 
 
1. Introduction 
A number of firm characteristics predict stock returns in the cross section. Since rational 
asset pricing models have difficulty explaining these return patterns, they are often viewed as 
evidence of mispricing (see, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Subrahmanyam, 
2007; Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam, 2011). On the other hand, as Fama and French 
(2006, 2008) and Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) point out, the standard valuation equation 
indicates that, controlling for book-to-market ratios and expected investment, variables that 
proxy for expected future cash flows are systematically related to expected returns. Because 
many anomaly variables are proxies for expected cash flows, as Fama and French (2008) argue, 
evidence that variables that predict future cash flows also predict returns does not help determine 
how much variation in expected returns is due to rational risk and how much is mispricing.  
In this paper we shed light on the two views by examining insider trading decisions 
among firms that exhibit anomalous returns. If the anomalous returns are due to mispricing and 
provide ex-ante profit opportunities, insiders should have taken advantage of such opportunities, 
to the legally permissible extent. Thus, the mispricing view implies that the distribution of the 
anomalous returns is systematically related to insider trading decisions. The rational risk view 
does not imply such a pattern.  
How would insiders profit from the anomalous returns? Conventional wisdom suggests 
that insiders buy undervalued and sell overvalued stocks. Thus, a test of mispricing entails 
comparing stock returns following insiders’ buying and selling decisions. This scope of 
comparison, however, can be inadequate in the context of return anomalies, because anomalous 
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returns occur mostly when the anomaly variables take extreme values (Fama and French, 2008), 
a situation in which insiders, due to regulations, might choose not to trade at all. That is, no 
insider trading, or insider silence, is one type of insider trading decisions in the presence of 
regulations. The most relevant element of regulations on insider trading that can lead to insider 
silence is the ―disclose or abstain‖ rule, which requires insiders to disclose the private 
information before trading on it or to abstain from trading. When disclosing information 
regarding a company’s business for a private benefit to an insider is not feasible—and often this 
is the case—then this rule essentially dictates that insiders do not trade while possessing private 
information. Accounting for the cost of enforcement, DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (1998) 
prescribe that the optimal enforcement follows large trading volume or large price movements or 
both and that under such enforcement policy insiders choose not to trade on extreme information 
and trade aggressively on intermediate information. Thus, regulated insider trading decisions 
include not only insider buying and selling, but also insider silence. 
We examine the implication of regulated insider trading for firms that exhibit anomalous 
returns, especially firms in the short legs of the anomalies. For firms in the short legs of the 
anomalies, we hypothesize that firms whose insiders kept silent in the past underperform firms 
whose insiders net sold, which in turn underperform firms whose insiders net bought.1  
Our empirical analysis focuses on the five anomalies that Fama and French (2008) 
examine: net stock issues, momentum, accruals, asset growth, and profitability. Our sample 
covers a relatively shorter time period (January 1990 to December 2010), during which the 
insider trading data is available. We first confirm that the anomalies exist during this time period, 
but are driven by the short legs, in which firms experience negative abnormal returns.  
                                                          
1
 Section 2 contains detailed development of the hypothesis. Although our main empirical analysis focuses on the 
short legs, where the anomalous returns are, we also develop and test the hypothesis for firms in the long legs.  
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Among firms in the short legs, we form portfolios based on their insider trading decisions 
over the past six months. Firms whose insiders net buy, net sell, and keep silent form the ―buy,‖ 
―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. For these portfolios we examine their future returns. 
We establish several results that are new to the literature. Over a holding period of up to 12 
months, the ―silence‖ portfolio experiences significant negative abnormal returns, which are 
even lower than the ―sell‖ portfolio, and this pattern holds for microcap firms as well as for large 
firms. The pattern is common across all anomalies examined. These results are consistent with 
the notion that insiders abstain from trading while possessing extremely negative information. 
Further, the impact of insider silence on the short leg returns is economically significant. Across 
the five anomalies, we estimate that insider silence accounts for an average of 64% of the 
abnormal returns in the short legs. There is also evidence that the ―sell‖ portfolio underperforms 
the ―buy‖ portfolio, a pattern that is particularly strong among microcap firms. The main results 
survive a battery of robustness checks, including alternative methodology of measuring abnormal 
returns (buy-and-hold vs. monthly alphas), alternative periods during which insider trading 
activity is measured (three, six, and 12 months), and alternative definitions of the anomaly 
variables. In addition, the underperformance of the ―silence‖ portfolio exists among firms with 
high or low litigation risk, firms with high or low institutional ownership, firms covered by few 
or many analysts, and firms with high and low return volatility.  
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypothesis and 
discusses the related literature. In Section 3 we describe the sample and data. Section 4 presents 
the main results, followed by robustness checks in Section 5. We discuss the results on the long 
legs of the anomalies in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. 
2. Literature and hypothesis  
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2.1. Return anomalies  
Prior research has found that numerous predetermined firm characteristics predict stock 
returns in the cross-section. For example, Banz (1981) finds that stock returns for small firms are 
abnormally high. Stocks with high book-to-market ratios have high average returns (Rosenberg, 
Reid, and Lanstein, 1985; Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok, 1991; Fama and French, 1992; 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). More profitable firms experience higher average future 
returns (Haugen and Baker, 1996; Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho, 2002). Firms that invest 
more, however, on average have lower returns (Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn, 2003; Titman, 
Wei, and Xie, 2004). Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that past winner stocks experience 
higher returns over the intermediate term and past loser stocks experience lower returns. Sloan 
(1996) finds that stock returns are negatively correlated with accruals. Consistent with the 
combined evidence that stock repurchases predict higher future returns (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen, 1995) and that stock issuance predicts lower future returns (Loughran and Ritter, 
1995), Daniel and Titman (2006) and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) show that net stock issues 
and future returns are negatively correlated. Because these return patterns are not explained by 
either the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or the three-factor model of Fama and French 
(1993), they are often interpreted as evidence of mispricing.  
As Fama and French (2006, 2008) and Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) point out, 
however, the standard valuation model indicates that, after controlling for book-to-market ratio 
and expected investment, variables that predict future cash flows are systematically correlated 
with expected returns. Thus, evidence that these variables predict future returns does not by itself 
distinguish whether the return patterns are due to mispricing or risk.   
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Examining five anomalies (net stock issues, momentum, accruals, asset growth, and 
profitability) altogether, Fama and French (2008) find that anomalous returns mostly occur when 
the anomaly variables take extreme values. In our analysis, we therefore focus on firms in the 
extremes of the anomaly variable distributions. 
2.2. Insider trading and mispricing 
Whether the return anomalies are due to mispricing or rational risk is of central interest to 
finance scholars. Fama and French (2006, 2008) argue that, according to the standard valuation 
equation, variables that are proxies for future cash flows are systematically related to expected 
returns. Thus, evidence of such a relation does not help distinguish the risk and mispricing views. 
Chen, Novy-Marx, and Zhang (2011) develop an alternative three-factor model to explain the 
anomalies. Choi and Sias (2012) explain why financial strength predicts future returns using 
subsequent institutional demand and find evidence that the return predictability is due to the 
gradual incorporation of information instead of rational risk. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) 
examine the relation between investor sentiment and anomaly returns and find that high level of 
investor sentiment is systematically related to a broad set of return anomalies. Antonio, Doukas, 
and Subrahmanyam (2011) study investor sentiment and momentum profits. 
We bring in insider trading to help distinguish between the risk and mispricing views, 
following the literature that relates insider trading to mispricing. Seyhun (1990), for example, 
studies insider trading patterns during and after the Crash of October 1987 to test if the Crash is 
due to noise trader overreaction instead of fundamental shifts. He finds that corporate insiders 
became buyers of stock in record numbers immediately following the Crash; that stocks that 
declined more during the Crash were also purchased more by insiders; and that stocks that were 
purchased more extensively by insiders during October 1987 showed larger positive returns in 
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1988. Based on these findings, Seyhun (1990) concludes that overreaction was an important part 
of the Crash.  
Rozeff and Zaman (1998) examine insider trading among growth and value stock 
categories and provide new insight into value premium. They argue that if value and growth 
categories provide profit opportunities insiders should have incentives to take advantage of the 
mispricing, to the legally permissible extent, by buying value and selling growth stocks. On the 
other hand, if growth and value categories are not meaningful measures of deviations of stock 
prices from fundamental values, then insider trades are not expected to be related to these 
categories. They find strong evidence that insider demand is systematically related to the 
value/growth categories. Insiders tend to buy value stocks and sell growth stocks. By controlling 
for insiders’ superior knowledge about future performance, Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) find 
evidence that insiders trade against mispricing. Jenter (2005) tests the hypothesis that managers 
perceive their own stock as misvalued when making corporate decisions by using managers' own 
portfolio trades as a window into their beliefs. He argues that because insiders trade with their 
own money insider trading is a strong and direct indicator of whether managers view their 
company stocks as mispriced. Sias and Whidbee (2010) examine whether insiders trade against 
institutions or individuals and find that net insider demand is negatively correlated with 
institutional demand of the same quarter as well as that of the past four quarters. After 
accounting for the impact of liquidity and stock characteristics, they attribute the remaining 
correlation between net insider demand and institutional demand to perceived mispricing. That 
is, insiders are more likely to perceive stocks as overvalued if institutions buy heavily in the past. 
2.3. Insider silence  
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The foregoing discussions suggest that one may test mispricing by examining insiders’ 
buying and selling decisions among firms that exhibit anomalous returns. Such a scope of 
comparison, however, is insufficient because the firms that exhibit anomalous returns are in the 
tails of the distributions of the anomaly variables. That is, these are the firms that have recently 
issued or repurchased extremely large amount of stocks, firms that are extremely unprofitable or 
extremely profitable, firms that have experienced extremely large price upswing or downturn, 
firms that have extremely high or low accruals, or firms that have grown extremely fast or have 
experienced large contractions. To the extent that such extreme business conditions are 
associated with extreme future stock price movements and that corporate insiders have superior 
knowledge about firm performance (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005), insiders might choose not to 
trade. This is because insider trading is regulated and in general trading on material, nonpublic 
information is illegal. To avoid regulatory action, insiders choose not to trade when they possess 
extreme information. The most relevant element of federal regulation on insider trading is the so-
called ―disclose or abstain‖ rule, which requires that insiders disclose the private information 
before trading on it. Since in most cases disclosure is not an option, this rule essentially requires 
that insiders do not trade while possessing private information. Taking into account the cost of 
enforcement, DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (1998) point out that the optimal enforcement 
follows large trading volume or large price movements or both and that insiders trade 
aggressively on intermediate information but do not trade when the information is extreme. 
Recently Gao and Ma (2012) report that insider silence is associated with extreme future returns, 
suggesting that insider silence is an important component of insider trading decisions. 
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To account for the impact of regulation on insider trading behavior, we consider the full 
spectrum of insider trading decisions: insider buying, insider selling, and insider silence. We 
discuss our hypothesis more formally in the next subsection. 
2.4. The regulated insider trading (RIT) hypothesis  
We propose and test a regulated insider trading (RIT) hypothesis to shed light on the role 
of mispricing for firms that exhibit anomalous returns. For ease of exposition, we develop the 
hypothesis separately for firms in the short and long legs of the anomalies.  
Note that firms in the short legs of the anomalies are associated with negative average 
future returns. If these returns represent deviations of stock prices from fundamental values they 
provide ex-ante profitable opportunities. Since insiders have superior knowledge, insiders should 
have exploited such opportunities, to the legally permissible extent. Thus, insiders buy or sell if 
they believe their firm future performance is not so extreme to trigger regulatory or legal action 
against them. On the other hand, if insiders believe their firm is to experience extremely negative 
performance, due to the fear of regulatory action, they choose not to sell. Neither would they 
buy, given the unfavorable prospects. Thus extremely negative future performance is associated 
with insider silence. In sum, we have the RIT hypothesis: Among firms in the short legs of the 
anomalies, insider silence predicts significant negative returns, which are even lower than returns 
of firms whose insiders net buy or sell. In addition, as conventional wisdom suggests, firms 
whose insiders net buy earn higher (less negative) future returns than firms whose insiders net 
sell. In sum, R(silence) < R(sell) < R(buy). 
For the long legs of the anomalies we maintain the hypothesis that portfolios with insider 
buying outperform portfolios with insider selling. That is, R(buy) > R(sell). When it comes to 
insider silence, there are at least two reasons for potential differences between short and long 
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legs. The first reason for the differences, in our setting, is related to insider trading decisions and 
the probability of legal action. Firms in the anomaly long legs tend to have positive returns. 
Because firms with positive returns are less likely to attract regulatory action (Gande and Lewis, 
2009), insiders are more likely to trade on the positive news (Cheng and Lo, 2006). Therefore, it 
is not expected that insider silence is associated with higher future returns, weakening the 
connection between insider silence and future positive returns.  
The second reason is that a positive signal is easier to arbitrage away and hence abnormal 
returns in the long legs of anomalies are more likely to decay. Arbitrageurs’ buying activity 
corrects the average undervaluation of firms in the long legs. For firms that reside in the left tail 
of the distribution of future performance, however, the buying activity pushes the prices above 
and further away from their intrinsic value, leading to overvaluation. Insiders of such firms, 
aware of the impact of arbitrageurs’ activity on firm valuation and the resulting reversal in the 
future, choose not to sell, as insider selling before stock price reversal would trigger regulatory 
or legal action. Neither do they buy, given the negative outlook. In these cases insiders will 
remain silent, strengthening the connection between insider silence and future negative returns in 
the long legs of anomalies.   
In sum, among firms in the long legs of the anomalies, insider silence is associated with 
lower returns than returns of firms whose insiders net buy or sell. 
3. Data and sample 
We obtain insider trading data from Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandates that officers and directors, large 
shareholders (those who own 10% or more of the outstanding shares), and affiliated shareholders 
report their transactions to the SEC by the 10
th
 of the month following the transactions (prior to 
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August 2002) or within two days (since August 2002). Following previous studies (e.g., Rozeff 
and Zaman, 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005; Sias and Whidbee, 2010), we limit our 
analysis to officers and directors because previous research shows the information content of 
insider trading is mainly limited to trades by directors and officers.
2
 Defined in equation (1), the 
net insider demand (NID) for month j is the total number of shares insiders buy minus the total 
number of shares insiders sell over the past six months, normalized by the total number of shares 
outstanding at the end of month j-1. Our main analyses are based on NID measured over the past 
six months, although our results are robust to NID measured over the past three or 12 months.  
      
                                                          
                       
     (1) 
We use NID to form portfolios. Firms with positive, non-positive, and missing NID form 
the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. The portfolio returns start from month j.  
We obtain stock return data from CRSP and accounting data from Compustat. In our 
analysis we focus on the five anomalies examined in Fama and French (2008), whom we follow 
to construct the anomaly variables. The five anomalies are net stock issues, momentum, accruals, 
growth of assets, and profitability. We follow the recent literature to construct the buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns after portfolio formation (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Sias and Whidbee, 2010). 
All variables are defined in greater detail in the Appendix.  
The sample is based on all NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks (share code 10 or 11) 
covered in CRSP/Compustat merged database from January 1990 to December 2010, a total of 
252 year/month cross-sections. The starting point of the sample period is determined by when 
                                                          
2
 We follow the literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Sias and Whidbee 2010) to ―clean‖ the insider trading 
data. Specifically, we use the following filters. We delete duplicate and amended records and records with cleanse 
code of ―S‖ or ―A‖ are deleted. Transaction price must be available, and we delete records if the number of shares in 
a transaction is below 100. The transaction code is either ―P‖ or ―S‖ for stock transactions and ―M‖ for options 
exercised. We delete transactions that involve more than 20% of total shares outstanding, and delete records if the 
transaction price is outside the 80%–120% range of the CRSP end-of-day stock price.  
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insider trading data is available. We apply standard filters: we exclude stocks whose prior 
month-end price is lower than $2 and firms that are younger than a year (from the first month on 
CRSP file with valid price and return data); we exclude financial firms (Standard Industry Codes 
between 6000 and 6999) and firms with missing or non-positive book value of equity. Because 
we examine the five anomalies separately, we do not require that all anomaly variables are non-
missing. Thus the average number of firms for a month varies across the anomalies and is 3,388, 
3,388, 3,054, 3,149, and 3,386 for the anomalies of net stock issues, momentum, accruals, 
growth of assets, and profitability, respectively.  
4. Main results  
Our portfolio construction closely follows Fama and French (2008). Specifically, every 
month we first sort firms into microcap and all but microcap (ABM, thereafter) groups, using the 
20
th
 NYSE size percentile as the cutoff point.
3
 Within each size group we further form portfolios 
based on one of the five anomaly variables. To be able to make meaningful comparisons between 
microcap and ABM firms, the sorts on an anomaly variable use the same breakpoints for both 
size groups, and the breakpoints come from the ABM firms only. For momentum we form 
simple quintiles. For net stock issues, we form quintiles for the positives (net issues), two equal 
groups for the negatives (net repurchases), and a group for the zeros, resulting in a total of eight 
groups. For the other three anomaly variables (accruals, growth of assets, and profitability) we 
form seven groups: two for the negatives and five for the positives.  
4.1. The anomalous returns  
We first confirm that in the shorter time period our dataset covers we still observe 
anomalous returns in the tails of the anomaly variables. Specifically, in Table 1 we show the 
                                                          
3





NYSE size percentiles) and large (above the 50
th
 percentile) firms. Instead we pool them together into the ABM 
group. Our main results, however, hold qualitatively in the two individual groups. 
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equal- and value-weight buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for the portfolios sorted on 
each of the anomaly variables over the holding period of one (Panel A) and 12 months (Panel B). 
For ease of exposition the portfolios are ordered from the short legs to the long legs, followed by 
the hedge (long minus short) portfolios. For example, the highest quintile of positive net stock 
issues (firms that issue equity heavily) predicts negative returns so it is presented in the column 
to the left, and the lower half of the negative net stock issues (firms that repurchase a large 
amount) predicts positive returns so it is presented in the column to the right. For Panel B, tests 
for all portfolio returns are based on Newey-West standard errors. To see the impact of firm size 
on anomaly returns we conduct the analysis for the whole market, microcap firms, and ABM 
firms, respectively. 
Panel A shows that the short leg of the net stock issues produces a one-month equal-
weight abnormal return of -0.67%, significant at the 1% level. This pattern holds for both 
microcap and ABM groups. The value-weight returns, however, are significant for the whole 
market and microcap firms, but not for the ABM firms. This result is consistent with the 
literature that firms earn significant negative returns after stock issuance. Except for the 
portfolios of the zeros, there is no systematic evidence of abnormal returns among the other 
portfolios. The returns are significant for all six hedge portfolios except for the value-weight 
ABM group. The overall pattern is consistent with Fama and French (2008) in that much of the 
action in anomalous returns occurs in the extremes where the anomaly variable—in this case net 
stock issues—takes extreme values. What is noteworthy, there are no significant positive returns 
in the long legs, which is consistent with investors exploiting academic research (McLean and 
Pontiff, 2012). Due to limits to arbitrage, however, the short legs, especially among microcap 
firms remain significant. This pattern of anomalous returns appears to hold in the other four 
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anomalies as well. On an equal-weight basis, the short legs experience significant negative 
returns, especially among microcap stocks. The pattern in value-weight returns is qualitatively 
similar. Except for momentum, there is no evidence of significant positive abnormal returns in 
the long legs. As is expected, it is much easier for outside investors to buy stocks on positive 
signals than to sell stocks short on negative signals.  
In Panel B we present the portfolio BHARs for a 12-month holding period. The general 
patterns across the portfolios are consistent with those in Panel A. Namely, there are significant 
negative returns in the short legs, there is not much evidence of abnormal returns in most of the 
other portfolios, and the hedge returns are positive, and significantly so for over half of the 
portfolios. In addition, the patterns are stronger in the microcap groups than in the ABM groups. 
The overall findings are consistent with Fama and French (2008) in that most of the action in 
anomalous returns occurs in the extremes and with McLean and Pontiff (2012) in that investors 
exploit return anomalies discovered by academic research subject to costly arbitrage.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The anomalous returns in the short legs suggest we focus on these firms.  
4.2. Regulated insider trading in the short legs 
Among firms in the short legs, we further form portfolios based on their insider trading 
activity over the past six months. Firms whose insiders net buy (positive NID), net sell (non-
positive NID), and keep silent (no insider trading activity) form the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ 
portfolios, respectively. We then examine the portfolios’ BHARs over the subsequent one to 12 
months. The RIT hypothesis implies that R(silence) < R(sell) < R(buy).  
Table 2 presents the portfolio BHARs for the holding periods of one, six, and 12 months, 
as well as the spreads between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios, and between the ―silence‖ and 
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―sell‖ portfolios. All tests are based on Newey-West standard errors. We conduct the analysis for 
the whole, microcap, and ABM groups, respectively. Figure 1 shows the BHARs of the three 
insider trading portfolios for holding periods of one to 12 months for the market (Panel A), 
microcap (Panel B), and ABM (Panel C) groups, respectively. 
The results in Table 2 strongly support the RIT hypothesis. In the case of net stock issues, 
for example, the ―silence‖ portfolio experiences an average abnormal return of -10.20% over a 
holding period of 12 months, while the returns of the ―sell‖ and ―buy‖ portfolios are -5.93% and 
-1.98%, respectively. Further, tests on the spreads clearly suggest that the ―silence‖ portfolio 
underperforms the ―sell‖ portfolio, which in turn underperforms the ―buy‖ portfolio. This pattern 
holds for the holding periods of one and six months as well.  
Further, the return pattern across the three insider trading portfolios holds for both 
microcap and ABM groups. There are, however, noticeable differences. For microcap firms, the 
spread between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios appears more significant than that between the 
―sell‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios. Among ABM firms, the spread between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ 
portfolios is more significant than that between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios. This asymmetric 
pattern in portfolio return spreads between the two size groups can be seen more clearly in 
Panels B and C of Figure 1. The evidence suggests that the impact of regulation on insider 
trading behavior is pervasive, and is particularly strong among relatively larger firms.  
Figure 2 shows, for each of the remaining four anomalies, the BHAR returns of the 
―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios over the holding periods of one to 12 months. For brevity 
we only show the results with the two size groups combined. It is clear that the ―silence‖ 
portfolios underperform both the corresponding ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios. The differences 
between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios, however, are significant only for accruals and 
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profitability, but not for momentum and asset growth, as shown in the corresponding panels in 
Table 2. Notably, in both size groups of all four anomalies the ―silence‖ portfolios underperform 
the corresponding ―sell‖ portfolios, and significantly so in most cases. By contrast, the ―buy‖ 
outperforms ―sell‖ mostly for microcap firms only. For the asset growth anomaly, the spread 
between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios among ABM firms becomes negative over the longer 
holding period, although the difference is not statistically significant.  
It is worth noting that insider silence is associated with even lower returns in microcap 
firms than in ABM firms. To the extent that insider silence is associated with less efficient 
prices, the evidence is consistent with the presumption that investors are better informed and that 
arbitrage cost is lower for larger firms. We later explore this issue in more depth within a broader 
context of limits to arbitrage or information uncertainty of the firms (see Section 5.4). 
To assess the economic significance of insider silence, we use equation (2) to estimate, 
for a 12-month holding period for all firms in the short legs of the anomalies, the proportion of 
the returns that is attributable to insider silence.  
                                
                                      
                 
  (2) 
For the anomaly of net stock issues, for example, the average BHAR for all firms in the 
short leg is -6.71% over a 12-month holding period (see Panel B of Table 1). Unreported for 
brevity, the estimated average BHAR excluding the ―silence‖ portfolio is -4.54%, which is a 
combination of the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios. Equation (2) implies that insider silence accounts 
for 32.3% (1-4.54/6.71) of the overall returns in the short leg. Similarly, we estimate that this 
proportion is 96.6%, 57.1%, 38.3%, and 96.4% for the anomalies of momentum, accruals, 
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growth of assets, and profitability, respectively. That is, insider silence accounts for an average 
of 64% of the short leg returns, across the five anomalies.4   
In sum, Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 establish a common pattern among the five 
anomalies, particularly regarding the firms in the short legs. First, there is a clear pecking order 
in returns among the three insider trading portfolios. Firms whose insiders keep silent 
underperform firms whose insiders sell, which in turn underperform firms whose insiders buy. 
This result supports the RIT hypothesis in that corporate insiders take advantage of the private 
information contained in the anomaly variables, to the legally permissible extent. Second, this 
pecking order is pervasive in that it exists in both microcap and relatively larger firms. Third, 
insider silence accounts for an economically significant portion of the anomalous returns. 
The evidence that these anomalous returns in the short legs of the anomalies are 
systematically related to insider trading decisions indicates that the anomalous returns are driven, 
at least partly, by investors underreacting to information contained in past insider trading 
decisions, particularly insider silence. In this regard, the evidence of a common pattern related to 
regulated insider trading lends further credence to the mispricing view of return anomalies.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Figures 1 & 2 about here] 
5. Robustness checks  
5.1. Alternative methodology: monthly alphas 
In our main analysis we use BHAR to measure abnormal returns. Estimating long-term 
abnormal returns has long been cautioned (e.g., Fama, 1998). Therefore, we check whether our 
results hold for alternative method of measuring abnormal returns. To do so we estimate monthly 
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alphas from the three-factor asset pricing model developed by Fama and French (1993). For ease 
of exposition we present three-month average monthly alphas for the four three-month periods 
following portfolio formation. Specifically, following the formation of each portfolio, we form 
calendar time equal- and value-weight portfolios of the stock returns over a three-month period 
and regress the excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors. The alphas are the 
average abnormal monthly returns for the three-month period.  
Table 3 presents the results for the three insider trading portfolios of firms in the short 
legs. To match the structure in Table 2 we also estimate the alphas for the microcap and ABM 
groups individually. The overall message in Table 3 is consistent with that in Table 2. We use 
net stock issue to illustrate the main point. With both microcap and ABM groups combined, the 
―silence‖ portfolio has significant equal-weight alphas of -1.06%, -1.00%, -0.97%, and -0.75% 
over the four three-month periods following portfolio formation, respectively. The ―sell‖ 
portfolio also has significant alphas over the four three-month periods. By contrasts, the alphas 
associated with the ―buy‖ portfolio are largely not significant. These findings are in general 
consistent with the BHAR patterns in Table 2. The spreads between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ 
portfolios and between the ―sell‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios are also consistent with the patterns in 
Table 2. The spread between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios becomes significant over the latter 
two three-month periods while that between the ―silence‖ and ―sell’ portfolios are significant in 
the earlier three three-month periods. The value-weight alphas exhibit a similar pattern.  
The general pattern holds in the microcap and ABM groups as well: both ―silence‖ and 
―sell‖ portfolios experience significant negative returns over the 12 months following portfolio 
formation, while the alphas associated with the ―buy‖ portfolios are mostly not significant. The 
spreads between the insider trading portfolios, however, differ between the two size groups. In 
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microcap firms, the spreads between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios are significant while those 
between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios are not. By contrasts, the ABM firms have significant 
spreads between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ but not between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios. These 
patterns are again consistent with those in Table 2. Value-weight alphas for the individual size 
groups show similar patterns.  
These patterns in the anomaly of net stock issues hold qualitatively in the remaining four 
anomalies as well, with minor caveats. For momentum, there is some evidence of reversal over 
the latter two three-month periods. For growth of assets, the spreads between the ―buy‖ and 
―sell‖ portfolios are actually negative and significant, particularly for the value-weight case in 
the ABM group. It appears that insiders in firms with extremely high asset growth are 
overconfident in that they net buy own company stocks that subsequently underperform.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5.2. Alternative definitions of net insider demand 
In our main analysis we measure net insider demand over a six-month window prior to 
portfolio formation. We now examine whether the main results in Table 2 hold for alternative 
windows to measure insider trading activity. To do so, we repeat the analysis in Table 2 by 
redefining the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios based on net insider demand measured over 
three- and 12-month periods, respectively.  
The results are presented in Table 4, which has the identical structure of Table 2. Panel A 
(B) is based on a window of 12- (three-) month period to measure past insider trading activity. 
When insider trading activity is measured over a longer (shorter) time period, fewer (more) firms 
join the ―silence‖ portfolios. For example, in the case of net stock issues, the average numbers of 
stocks in the ―silence‖ portfolios in Table 2 for the microcap and ABM groups are 123 and 50, 
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respectively, and these numbers decrease to 79 and 27 in Panel A (a longer window) of Table 4 
and increase to 169 and 84 in Panel B (a shorter window) of Table 4, respectively.  
Despite change in composition of the portfolios due to alternative windows to measure 
past insider trading activity, the overall patterns shown in both Panels of Table 4 are remarkably 
similar to those shown in Table 2. Notably, the ―silence‖ portfolios underperform the ―sell‖ 
portfolios, especially among the relatively larger firms and the ―buy‖ portfolios outperform the 
―sell‖ portfolios, especially among the microcap firms.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
5.3. Alternative definitions of anomaly variables  
In our main analysis we follow Fama and French (2008) to define the anomaly variables. 
For some of the anomaly variables, there are alternative definitions used in the literature. Largely 
following Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), we use NS12 and NS6 as alternative definitions for 
net stock issues, Mom6 for momentum, and Inv and AG for asset growth. These variables are 
defined in the Appendix.   
For these five alternatively defined anomaly variables, we conduct the same analysis as in 
Table 2 and present the results in Table 5. Once again, our main results hold. For brevity, we do 
not go into the details but simply reiterate the main patterns that the ―silence‖ portfolios 
underperform the ―sell‖ portfolios, especially among larger firms and that the ―buy‖ portfolios 
outperform the ―sell‖ portfolios, especially among microcap firms. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.4. Information environment and limits to arbitrage 
Our findings so far suggest that regulated insider trading, in particular insider silence, at 
least partially accounts for the negative returns in the short legs of the anomalies. That is, due to 
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fear of regulatory and legal action, insiders choose not to sell (nor to buy) own firm shares while 
possessing extremely bad information, which is reflected in significant negative future returns. 
The lack of insider trading decreases the flow of insider information into the market, leading to 
less efficient prices. The evidence suggests that either investors are not fully rational about the 
insider silence information, or arbitrage is costly, or both. It is possible, for example, that there 
are not enough investors that are informed about insider silence, or that high stock volatility acts 
as an impediment to arbitrage and prevents informed investors from fully taking advantage of the 
price inefficiency. 
To explore the role of information environment in insider silence, we use institutional 
ownership and number of analysts following as proxies.5 Due to competition, higher institutional 
ownership increases price discovery and information efficiency (Chiang, Qian, and Sherman, 
2010); institutional investors take advantage of mispricing in equity markets (Cohen, Gompers, 
and Vuolteenaho, 2002; Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz, 2009). Thus a higher level of 
institutional ownership implies more intensive information acquisition, more informed trading 
and consequently more efficient prices (Sias, Starks, and Titman, 2006; Boehmer and Kelly, 
2009). Analysts collect, analyze and distribute information about a firm. Thus a firm with more 
analysts following is associated with better information environment and more efficient prices 
(e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 
2000; Asquith, Mikhail, and Au, 2005).  
To explore the role of limits to arbitrage, we use stock volatility as a proxy. According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), real-life arbitrageurs have relatively short investment horizons. Thus 
                                                          
5
 Similar proxies are discussed in Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), Baker and Wurgler (2006), Brav, Heaton, and 
Li (2010), and Lam and Wei (2011). See also Choi and Sias (2012). Our conclusion in this section holds for other 
proxies such as firm age, number of institutional owners, stock liquidity, etc. Unreported for brevity, the results are 
available upon request. 
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arbitrageurs might be forced to liquidate their positions when the prices move against them. 
Stocks with greater volatility exacerbate such risk. Understanding these risks, arbitrageurs may 
abstain from more volatile stocks, allowing mispricing to prevail to a larger extent among 
portfolios of more volatile firms.  
Taken together, these discussions suggest that, among firms in the ―silence‖ portfolios, 
those with higher institutional ownership, more analysts following, and lower stock volatility are 
associated with lower degree of mispricing (less negative future returns).  
Note that all three proxies are correlated with firm size, and, as our earlier results 
indicate, the returns associated with insider silence are also correlated with firm size. Thus in our 
empirical analysis we control for size. Specifically, we first sort firms into microcap (below the 
20
th




 NYSE size percentiles), and large 
(above the 50
th
 NYSE size percentile) groups. Within each size group we sort firms into terciles 
on one of the three proxies. The terciles are then pooled across the size groups. We estimate the 
BHARs for each tercile. Table 6 presents the results for the two extreme terciles and the t-
statistics testing equal means between the two. From these results we test 1) whether insider 
silence predicts significant negative future returns even among firms with better information 
environment or low limits to arbitrage; and 2) whether firms with worse information 
environment or greater limits to arbitrage are associated with even lower returns (thus more 
mispricing). 
The top panel of Table 6 shows the results for institutional ownership terciles. The 
negative and significant BHARs presented in the middle three columns suggest that insider 
silence is associated with significant negative future returns even when the firms have high 
institutional ownership. When institutional ownership is low, these abnormal returns are even 
 22 
 
lower. For example, in the case of net stock issues, over a 12-month holding period, the BHAR 
associated with high institutional ownership is -6.49% while that with low institutional 
ownership is -13.95%. The difference between the two has a t-statistics of 2.98, as presented in 
the last column of the first row. This pattern of more negative BHARs associated with low 
institutional ownership holds in general for all the holding periods and for all the five anomalies. 
Shown in the last three columns of the top panel in Table 6, 10 out of 15 t-statistics are above 2 
and the minimum is 1.37. The patterns for analyst following are similar. Insider silence is 
associated with significant negative future returns even for firms with many analysts following 
and firms with fewer analysts exhibit more negative BHARs. 
For volatility, we find that for stocks with high or low volatility BHARs are negative and 
highly statistically significant for all anomalies at all horizons. In all 30 cases but one, the 
significance is at 1% level. The results also indicate that abnormal returns for high volatility 
stocks are more negative than abnormal returns for low volatility stocks.  
Taken together, the overall results in Table 6 are consistent with our conjecture that 
worse information environment and greater limits to arbitrage are associated with more negative 
returns. Improved information environment and weaker limits to arbitrage, however, do not 
explain the negative returns associated with insider silence.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.5. The role of litigation risk  
Firms vary in terms of litigation risk (Kim and Skinner, 2012). A question then arises 
whether insider silence acts as a proxy for litigation risk. To explore this possibility, we compute 
a measure of litigation risk for the firms in our sample (the measure, KS, is defined in the 
Appendix). We then separate firms in the short legs whose insiders do not trade over the past six 
 23 
 
months into two groups with low and high litigation risk, respectively, and examine their future 
returns. Table 7 presents the BHARs of the two litigation risk groups. The results show that that 
negative returns following insider silence hold in both high litigation risk and low litigation risk 
subsamples. All are significant at least at the 5% level, and in the vast majority the significance 
is at the 1% level. Therefore, the main results are not likely to be driven by litigation risk.   
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5.6. Summary 
The main results survive a battery of robustness checks. The results hold when 
performance is measure by alphas rather than buy-and-hold abnormal returns. The results remain 
unchanged under alternative definitions of the anomaly variables and alternative windows to 
measure insider trading activity. The results also hold for firms with high and low institutional 
ownership, with few and many analysts following, and with high and low volatility. The results 
are not driven by litigation risk.6    
6. Regulated insider trading and the long legs of the anomalies 
We now study the long legs of the anomalies. We maintain the hypothesis that portfolios 
with insider buying outperform portfolios with insider selling. When it comes to insider silence, 
there are at least two reasons for potential differences between short and long legs. The first 
reason for the differences, in our setting, is related to insider trading decisions and the probability 
of legal action. Firms in the anomaly long legs tend to have positive returns. Because firms with 
positive returns are less likely to attract regulatory action (Gande and Lewis, 2009), insiders are 
more likely to trade on the positive news (Cheng and Lo, 2006). Therefore, it is not expected that 
                                                          
6
 The original sample covers the period January 1990 to December 2010, which includes extremely volatile years at 
the end of the sample. The test whether our results are affected by extreme volatility at the end of the sample, we 
repeat our main analysis excluding the years 2007—2010. The results (not reported for brevity) are remarkably 
similar to Table 2.   
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insider silence is associated with higher future returns, weakening the connection between 
insider silence and future positive returns.  
The second reason is that a positive signal is easier to arbitrage away and hence abnormal 
returns in the long legs of anomalies are more likely to decay. Arbitrageurs’ buying activity 
corrects the average undervaluation of firms in the long legs. For firms that reside in the left tail 
of the distribution of future performance, however, the buying activity pushes the prices above 
and further away from their intrinsic value, leading to overvaluation. Insiders of such firms, 
aware of the impact of arbitrageurs’ activity on firm valuation and the resulting reversal in the 
future, choose not to sell, as insider selling before stock price reversal would trigger regulatory 
or legal action. Neither do they buy, given the negative outlook. In these cases insiders will 
remain silent, strengthening the connection between insider silence and future negative returns in 
the long legs of anomalies.   
Table 8 shows buy-and-hold abnormal returns for insider trading portfolios for firms in 
the anomaly long legs. The first panel shows results for the net stock issues anomaly. There is 
some evidence that the ―buy‖ portfolio experiences positive future returns. The 12-month BHAR 
for the whole market and microcap firms are 3.19% and 4.14%, both significant at the 5% level. 
The ―silence‖ portfolios are associated with negative future returns, although none is significant. 
There are no significant returns associated with the ―sell‖ portfolio, either. As expected, the 
―silence‖ portfolios significantly underperform the ―buy‖ portfolios. For the whole market, the 
spread between the ―silence‖ and ―buy‖ portfolios equals -0.34% (t = - 2.14), -1.90% (t = -2.12) 
and -4.51% (t = -2.74) for the one-, six- and 12-month horizons, respectively. The differences in 
abnormal returns are larger in magnitude for microcaps and are equal to -0.36% (t = -1.69), -
2.05% (t=-1.64), -5.88% (t=-2.19) for the one-, six-, and 12-month horizons, respectively.  
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Similar patterns hold for the other four anomalies, with some notable differences. For 
momentum, accruals, and asset growth, the ―silence‖ portfolios are associated with significant 
negative abnormal returns, especially among microcap firms. Results with profitability are the 
weakest. Nevertheless, the significant negative spreads between the ―silence‖ and ―buy‖ 
portfolios hold across all five anomalies, especially among the microcap firms.  
Overall, the findings on the long legs are also consistent with the notion that insiders 
possess superior knowledge about their own firms and that they exploit the information in their 
own trading, to the legally permissible extent.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we use insider trading to shed light on the role of mispricing in return 
anomalies. We document a common feature among a broad set of return anomalies. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that insiders buy shares on positive information and sell on 
negative information. Under regulations of insider trading, however, insiders keep silent when 
they possess extreme information. We find that this pattern of regulated insider trading is closely 
related to a broad set of return anomalies, particularly in the short legs. Specifically, among firms 
with extreme characteristics that predict anomalously low returns, firms whose insiders kept 
silent in the past earn significant negative future returns, which are even lower than when 
insiders net sold. We estimate that this phenomenon of insider silence explains about 64% of the 
anomalous returns in the short legs of the anomalies. The results remain after a battery of 
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Table 1: Average abnormal returns for portfolios formed using sorts on anomaly variables 
 
Panel A: One-month holding period 







Hi 4 3 2 Low Zero Hi Low Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -0.67a -0.10 0.10 0.07 -0.04 -0.54a -0.03 0.05 0.72a 
Micro -0.90a -0.15 0.07 -0.03 -0.13 -0.61a -0.12 -0.01 0.89a 
ABM -0.40a -0.04 0.13 0.18a 0.05 -0.26c 0.06 0.13 0.53a 
Value-weight 
Market -0.25c -0.24 0.04 0.12 -0.10 -0.22 -0.02 0.09 0.34c 
Micro -0.62b 0.01 0.32 -0.06 -0.07 -0.45b -0.04 -0.08 0.54b 
ABM -0.23 -0.24 0.04 0.13 -0.10 -0.18 -0.02 0.09 0.32 
Sort on Momentum, Mom 
 
Loser 2 3 4 Winner 
   
Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -0.63a -0.23a -0.12 0.10 0.45b 
   
1.08a 
Micro -0.90a -0.39a -0.19 0.25 0.60a 
   
1.50a 
ABM -0.22 -0.07 -0.08 -0.00 0.32 
   
0.54 
Value-weight 
Market -0.29 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 0.28 
   
0.56 
Micro -0.86a -0.36b -0.19 0.25 0.64b 
   
1.50a 
ABM -0.24 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 0.27 
   
0.51 







Hi 4 3 2 Low 
 
Hi Low Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -0.35a -0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.08 
 
-0.11 -0.07 0.29a 
Micro -0.52a -0.14 -0.06 -0.12 -0.13 
 
-0.21c -0.16 0.36a 
ABM -0.04 0.01 0.11 0.02 -0.03 
 
-0.03 0.08 0.12 
Value-weight 
Market -0.32b 0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.16 
 
-0.13 0.08 0.40b 
Micro -0.29c -0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.26 
 
-0.10 -0.06 0.23c 
ABM -0.32b 0.06 0.01 -0.09 -0.16 
 
-0.13 0.09 0.41b 







Hi 4 3 2 Low 
 
Hi Low Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -0.61a -0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 
 
-0.02 -0.11 0.49a 
Micro -0.88a -0.26c -0.09 -0.19 -0.18 
 
-0.07 -0.16 0.72a 
ABM -0.33b 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.07 
 
0.06 -0.02 0.31b 
Value-weight 
Market -0.19 0.02 0.12 -0.04 -0.14 
 
-0.15 -0.08 0.11 
Micro -0.67a -0.13 -0.05 -0.13 -0.15 
 
0.05 0.04 0.72a 
ABM -0.17 0.03 0.12 -0.04 -0.14 
 
-0.16 -0.09 0.09 
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Low 2 3 4 Hi Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -0.49a -0.28a 
 
-0.18b -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 0.11 0.60b 
Micro -0.51a -0.33a 
 
-0.29b -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 0.01 0.52c 
ABM -0.32 -0.15 
 
-0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.18c 0.50c 
Value-weight 
Market -0.18 -0.21 
 
-0.14 -0.15 -0.15c -0.08 0.04 0.23 
Micro -0.26 -0.29 
 
-0.22 -0.05 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 0.33 
ABM -0.14 -0.18 
 
-0.13 -0.15 -0.15c -0.08 0.05 0.18 
 
 
Panel B: 12-month holding period 







Hi 4 3 2 Low Zero Hi Low Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -6.71a -0.24 1.99 0.13 -0.25 -4.55a -0.97 0.32 7.03a 
Micro -8.48a -0.81 2.15 -0.17 -1.09 -5.10a -1.43 -0.07 8.42a 
ABM -4.26a 0.76 1.77 0.37 0.70 -2.70c -0.45 0.92 5.18b 
Value-weight 
Market -3.05b -2.00 1.41 0.36 -1.21 -1.85 -0.27 0.70 3.75c 
Micro -7.54a 1.10 3.65 -1.55 -1.76 -4.47b -1.19 -1.10 6.44a 
ABM -2.77c -2.07 1.39 0.43 -1.20 -1.52 -0.26 0.74 3.51c 
Sort on Momentum, Mom 
 
Loser 2 3 4 Winner 
   
Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -2.29 -1.44 -1.01 -0.64 -0.11 
   
2.17 
Micro -3.23b -2.38 -1.38 -0.77 -1.00 
   
2.23 
ABM -0.32 -0.44 -0.69 -0.64 0.97 
   
1.29 
Value-weight 
Market -0.61 -1.17 -1.45 -1.41 1.55 
   
2.16 
Micro -2.65c -2.11 -1.38 -1.13 -0.12 
   
2.54 
ABM -0.45 -1.15 -1.45 -1.42 1.70 
   
2.15 







Hi 4 3 2 Low 
 
Hi Low Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -3.38a 0.41 0.22 -0.96 -1.45 
 
-1.18 -0.44 2.93a 
Micro -4.91a -0.06 -0.65 -1.05 -1.97 
 
-1.96 -1.24 3.68a 
ABM -0.50 0.89 0.99 -0.98c -0.87 
 
-0.53 0.90 1.40 
Value-weight 
Market -3.30a 1.02 0.76 -0.99 -1.75 
 
-1.52 0.63 3.93a 
Micro -3.85a 0.19 -0.74 -0.49 -3.54 
 
-1.97 -1.17 2.68b 
ABM -3.27a 1.06 0.79 -1.00 -1.72 
 
-1.51 0.74 4.01a 
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Hi 4 3 2 Low 
 
Hi Low Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -4.66a -1.02 -0.09 -0.56 -0.01 
 
-0.32 -1.02 3.64b 
Micro -6.96a -3.05c -0.46 -2.39 -0.40 
 
-0.53 -1.27 5.68b 
ABM -2.17c 0.68 0.33 1.11 0.35 
 
0.10 -0.59 1.58 
Value-weight 
Market -1.08 1.52 1.00 -0.89 -2.34b 
 
-1.95b -0.89 0.19 
Micro -5.26a -1.75 -0.13 -2.70 -1.00 
 
0.05 -0.91 4.36c 
ABM -0.89 1.61 1.02 -0.85 -2.35b 
 
-2.01b -0.79 0.10 









Low 2 3 4 Hi Hedge 
Equal-weight 
Market -3.66c -2.04 
 
-1.73 -0.65 -0.19 -0.99 0.50 4.16 
Micro -3.68c -2.39 
 
-2.53 -0.59 -0.41 -2.94 -2.03 1.65 
ABM -2.39 -0.96 
 
-0.53 -0.62 0.02 0.04 1.98c 4.38 
Value-weight 
Market -1.09 -2.19 
 
-2.09 -2.14b -1.58c -1.15 0.79 1.88 
Micro -2.64 -1.89 
 
-2.87 -0.80 -0.10 -2.66 -1.05 1.59 
ABM -0.44 -2.22 
 
-2.06 -2.18b -1.61b -1.14 0.81 1.24 
 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 
2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly variable and order the portfolios from the short legs in the 
left to the long legs in the right, followed by a hedge portfolio (long minus short). For each 
portfolio we present the time-series average of the equal- and value-weight BHAR over one- 
(Panel A) and 12-month (Panel B) holding periods. The rows ―Market,‖ ―Micro,‖ and ―ABM‖ 
represent firms in the whole market, microcap firms, and all-but-microcap firms, respectively. 
Microcap and ABM firms are separated by the 20
th
 NYSE size percentile. Tests on the average 
BHARs are based on Newey-West standard errors. For momentum we form five quintiles; for 
profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the positives and two equal 
groups for the negatives; for net stock issues we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal 
groups for the negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms 
only. The five anomaly variables and BHAR are defined in the Appendix. Superscripts a, b, and 






Table 2: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for insider trading portfolios for firms in the short legs of the anomalies 
 
  Market   Micro   ABM 
  Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
Sort on Net Stock Issues, NS 
Silence 173 -1.09a -5.85a -10.20a 
 
123 -1.25a -6.36a -11.28a 
 
50 -0.74a -4.58a -7.80a 
Buy 93 -0.23 -1.24c -1.98c 
 
61 -0.32 -1.49 -2.56c 
 
32 -0.11 -0.80 -0.77 
Sell 213 -0.50a -3.18a -5.93a 
 
92 -0.75a -4.49a -8.82a 
 
121 -0.30b -2.07a -3.62a 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.27 1.94a 3.96a 
  
0.44c 3.00a 6.26a 
  
0.19 1.26 2.85 
  
[1.57] [3.20] [3.64] 
  
[1.77] [3.31] [4.64] 
  
[0.81] [1.25] [1.47] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.59a -2.67a -4.26a 
  
-0.49b -1.87b -2.46 
  
-0.45b -2.51a -4.19b 
   [-4.14] [-4.17] [-3.15]   [-2.30] [-2.06] [-1.49]   [-2.41] [-2.82] [-2.14] 
Sort on Momentum, Mom 
Silence 375 -1.09a -4.51a -5.23a 
 
282 -1.32a -5.27a -6.09a 
 
93 -0.55b -2.51b -2.83 
Buy 237 -0.03 -0.85 0.59 
 
164 -0.25 -1.28 0.12 
 
74 0.30 -0.14 1.22 
Sell 286 -0.54a -1.80b -0.37 
 
146 -0.86a -2.53a -1.04 
 
140 -0.26 -0.81 0.96 
             Buy-Sell 
 
0.52a 0.95c 0.97 
  
0.61a 1.25c 1.15 
  
0.57a 0.67 0.26 
  
[4.12] [1.96] [0.85] 
  
[3.69] [1.90] [0.83] 
  
[3.30] [1.17] [0.19] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.54a -2.71a -4.85a 
  
-0.46a -2.74a -5.05a 
  
-0.29c -1.71a -3.80a 
   [-4.51] [-5.86] [-3.71]   [-2.81] [-5.04] [-3.13]   [-1.92] [-3.07] [-2.81] 
Sort on Accruals, Ac/B 
Silence 186 -0.68a -3.88a -6.14a 
 
147 -0.85a -4.65a -7.41a 
 
39 -0.29c -1.71b -2.43 
Buy 98 0.28b 0.83 0.94 
 
72 0.25 0.93 1.01 
 
26 0.31 -0.05 -0.14 
Sell 198 -0.33a -1.75a -2.49b 
 
103 -0.58a -3.27a -5.55a 
 
94 -0.03 -0.12 0.72 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.61a 2.58a 3.43b 
  
0.83a 4.20a 6.56a 
  
0.34 0.06 -0.86 
  
[3.94] [3.12] [2.48] 
  
[4.27] [4.08] [3.83] 
  
[1.46] [0.05] [-0.37] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.36a -2.13a -3.64b 
  
-0.27 -1.37c -1.86 
  
-0.25 -1.59c -3.15 





(Table 2 continued) 
  Market   Micro   ABM 
  Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
Sort on Asset Growth, dA/A 
Silence 143 -1.02a -5.24a -8.04a 
 
95 -1.22a -6.07a -9.54a 
 
47 -0.64a -3.47a -4.94a 
Buy 79 -0.17 -2.47a -3.34a 
 
49 -0.30 -3.20a -4.11b 
 
30 -0.05 -1.80b -2.84c 
Sell 228 -0.48a -2.56a -2.78b 
 
83 -0.84a -4.49a -6.36a 
 
145 -0.28c -1.42b -0.69 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.31c 0.10 -0.56 
  
0.54a 1.29 2.24 
  
0.23 -0.38 -2.14 
  
[1.93] [0.17] [-0.47] 
  
[2.69] [1.36] [1.24] 
  
[0.97] [-0.42] [-1.21] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.54a -2.68a -5.26a 
  
-0.39b -1.58c -3.19b 
  
-0.36b -2.05b -4.24b 
   [-3.99] [-3.76] [-3.48]   [-2.10] [-1.85] [-2.15]   [-1.98] [-2.48] [-2.38] 
Sort on Profitability, Y/B 
Silence 254 -0.92a -4.17a -7.45a 
 
213 -0.97a -4.11a -7.21a 
 
41 -0.60b -3.64b -7.17a 
Buy 121 0.37b 1.33 3.84 
 
99 0.38c 1.55 4.33 
 
22 0.33 0.41 1.87 
Sell 185 -0.40c -1.88 -2.86 
 
116 -0.38 -2.00 -3.63 
 
69 -0.33 -0.85 -0.32 
             Buy-Sell 
 
0.77a 3.21a 6.70a 
  
0.76a 3.55a 7.96a 
  
0.66b 1.26 2.20 
  
[4.36] [4.24] [5.66] 
  
[3.69] [4.55] [5.68] 
  
[2.00] [0.85] [0.74] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.52a -2.29a -4.59b 
  
-0.59a -2.10a -3.58c 
  
-0.27 -2.79a -6.84a 
   [-3.32] [-3.55] [-2.58]   [-3.10] [-2.61] [-1.88]   [-1.03] [-2.75] [-2.71] 
 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the 
positives and two equal groups for the negatives; for net stock issues we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups for the 
negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. We retain the short legs only. Within the firms in the 
short legs we further form portfolios based on their net insider demand (NID) over the past six months. NID is defined in equation (1). 
Firms with past positive, non-positive, and missing NID form the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. For each 
portfolio we present the time-series average of the equal-weight BHARs over one-, six-, and 12-month holding periods. The spreads 
between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios and between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios are also presented, together with their Newey-
West t-statistics in brackets. The analyses are conducted for all firms in the short legs (Market), microcap firms (Micro), and all-but-
micro firms (ABM), respectively. Microcap and ABM firms are separated by the 20
th
 NYSE size percentile. All tests are based on 
Newey-West standard errors. The five anomaly variables and BHAR are defined in the Appendix. Superscripts a, b, and c represent 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3: Monthly alphas for every three-month period following portfolio formation 
 


































Sort on Net Stock Issues, NS 
Equal-weight 
Silence -1.06a -1.00a -0.97a -0.75a 
 
-1.05a -0.89a -0.88a -0.64b 
 
-0.89a -1.13a -1.07a -0.91a 
Buy -0.33 -0.29 -0.19 -0.13 
 
-0.21 -0.25 -0.10 -0.03 
 
-0.39c -0.29 -0.22 -0.25 
Sell -0.56a -0.58a -0.61a -0.49a 
 
-0.70a -0.67a -0.82a -0.75a 
 
-0.38a -0.39b -0.39b -0.25 
               Buy-Sell 0.24 0.29 0.42a 0.36b 
 
0.49b 0.42c 0.71a 0.73a 
 
-0.01 0.11 0.16 0.01 
Silence-Sell -0.50a -0.42b -0.36b -0.26 
 
-0.35 -0.22 -0.06 0.11 
 
-0.51b -0.74a -0.69a -0.66a 
Value-weight 
Silence -0.43b -0.69a -1.01a -0.81a 
 
-0.88a -0.90a -1.09a -0.82a 
 
-0.31 -0.65a -0.98a -0.78a 
Buy -0.30 -0.21 0.24 -0.19 
 
-0.11 -0.33 -0.37 -0.41 
 
-0.28 -0.17 0.34 -0.13 
Sell -0.31b -0.28b -0.22 -0.23 
 
-0.49b -0.51b -0.73a -0.78a 
 
-0.29b -0.25c -0.19 -0.20 
             Buy-Sell 0.01 0.07 0.46c 0.04 
 
0.38 0.18 0.37c 0.38 
 
0.01 0.08 0.53c 0.07 
Silence-Sell -0.13 -0.41 -0.79a -0.58b  -0.39 -0.39c -0.35 -0.04  -0.02 -0.40 -0.79a -0.58b 
Sort on Momentum, Mom 
Equal-weight 
Silence -0.92a -0.54b -0.15 0.09 
 
-0.92a -0.45c -0.04 0.27 
 
-0.77a -0.68a -0.41 -0.28 
Buy -0.20 -0.12 0.21 0.32 
 
-0.16 0.02 0.35 0.44c 
 
-0.21 -0.34 -0.11 0.15 
Sell -0.52b -0.17 0.10 0.32 
 
-0.55b -0.08 0.20 0.34 
 
-0.39 -0.15 0.10 0.36 
             Buy-Sell 0.32a 0.05 0.11 -0.00 
 
0.39a 0.09 0.15 0.10 
 
0.18 -0.19 -0.22 -0.21 
Silence-Sell -0.40a -0.36b -0.26c -0.24c 
 
-0.37a -0.37b -0.24 -0.07 
 
-0.38a -0.53a -0.52a -0.65a 
Value-weight 
Silence -0.55b -0.42 -0.22 -0.19 
 
-1.06a -0.57b -0.25 0.02 
 
-0.45 -0.37 -0.21 -0.17 
Buy -0.04 -0.25 0.06 0.08 
 
-0.16 -0.09 0.14 0.18 
 
-0.03 -0.27 0.03 0.09 
Sell -0.33 -0.21 0.11 0.17 
 
-0.71a -0.16 0.17 0.21 
 
-0.31 -0.20 0.10 0.18 
               Buy-Sell 0.29 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 
 
0.55a 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 
 
0.28 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 





Table 3 (continued) 


































Sort on Accruals, Ac/B 
Equal-weight 
Silence -0.63a -0.56a -0.31 -0.38c 
 
-0.66a -0.57a -0.28 -0.34 
 
-0.54a -0.52a -0.39c -0.46b 
Buy 0.26 0.17 -0.00 -0.02 
 
0.39c 0.33 0.09 0.05 
 
-0.09 -0.33 -0.27 -0.16 
Sell -0.31b -0.25c -0.21 -0.18 
 
-0.43a -0.34c -0.34c -0.34c 
 
-0.13 -0.11 -0.06 0.01 
               Buy-Sell 0.57a 0.43a 0.21 0.16 
 
0.81a 0.68a 0.43b 0.39b 
 
0.05 -0.21 -0.21 -0.17 
Silence-Sell -0.32b -0.31b -0.09 -0.20 
 
-0.23 -0.23 0.06 0.00 
 
-0.40b -0.41b -0.32c -0.47a 
Value-weight 
Silence -0.28 -0.21 -0.47b -0.58a 
 
-0.68a -0.64a -0.39c -0.59a 
 
-0.15 -0.10 -0.46c -0.56b 
Buy 0.16 -0.04 -0.09 -0.07 
 
0.47b 0.21 -0.04 -0.04 
 
0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 
Sell -0.29c -0.28 -0.30 -0.33 
 
-0.27 -0.27 -0.46b -0.58a 
 
-0.27 -0.26 -0.28 -0.30 
             Buy-Sell 0.45c 0.24 0.21 0.26 
 
0.75a 0.48b 0.42b 0.54b 
 
0.39 0.16 0.17 0.22 
Silence-Sell 0.01 0.07 -0.18 -0.25  -0.40c -0.37c 0.07 -0.01  0.11 0.16 -0.19 -0.25 
Sort on Growth of Assets, dA/A 
Equal-weight 
Silence -1.02a -0.82a -0.59b -0.55b 
 
-1.03a -0.73a -0.54b -0.47c 
 
-0.85a -0.84a -0.61b -0.61b 
Buy -0.37c -0.53b -0.46b -0.25 
 
-0.38 -0.53b -0.48b -0.19 
 
-0.35 -0.52c -0.44c -0.27 
Sell -0.49a -0.45a -0.35b -0.13 
 
-0.69a -0.58a -0.59a -0.39c 
 
-0.29c -0.28c -0.16 0.04 
             Buy-Sell 0.12 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 
 
0.31 0.05 0.11 0.20 
 
-0.06 -0.24 -0.28 -0.30c 
Silence-Sell -0.54a -0.37b -0.24 -0.42a 
 
-0.34c -0.14 0.05 -0.08 
 
-0.55a -0.56a -0.45b -0.65a 
Value-weight 
Silence -0.63b -0.83a -0.54b -0.59b 
 
-0.96a -0.69a -0.66a -0.62b 
 
-0.56b -0.81a -0.50b -0.54b 
Buy -0.55b -0.64b -0.57b -0.58b 
 
-0.19 -0.33 -0.59a -0.31 
 
-0.58c -0.68b -0.56c -0.57c 
Sell -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.06 
 
-0.57a -0.49b -0.46b -0.38c 
 
0.01 -0.07 -0.00 0.07 
               Buy-Sell -0.54c -0.55c -0.55c -0.64b 
 
0.38c 0.16 -0.13 0.08 
 
-0.59c -0.61c -0.56c -0.65b 





Table 3 (continued) 


































Sort on Profitability, Y/B 
Equal-weight 
Silence -0.84a -0.74a -0.63b -0.53c 
 
-0.79a -0.60b -0.49 -0.43 
 
-0.84a -1.20a -0.99a -0.83a 
Buy 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.18 
 
0.27 0.21 0.32 0.33 
 
-0.27 -0.19 -0.25 -0.31 
Sell -0.57a -0.42c -0.33 -0.37 
 
-0.43c -0.31 -0.34 -0.48c 
 
-0.52b -0.26 -0.17 -0.12 
               Buy-Sell 0.71a 0.53a 0.53a 0.54a 
 
0.69a 0.52a 0.66a 0.81a 
 
0.25 0.08 -0.08 -0.19 
Silence-Sell -0.27c -0.32b -0.30c -0.16 
 
-0.37b -0.28 -0.14 0.05 
 
-0.32 -0.93a -0.82a -0.71a 
Value-weight 
Silence -0.58b -0.77b -0.55c -0.75b 
 
-0.75a -0.73a -0.79a -0.79a 
 
-0.51 -0.74c -0.47 -0.67c 
Buy 0.07 0.31 0.29 0.06 
 
0.46b 0.29 0.10 0.01 
 
-0.06 0.26 0.29 0.10 
Sell -0.33 -0.07 -0.33 -0.33 
 
-0.41 -0.22 -0.45c -0.49c 
 
-0.28 0.02 -0.25 -0.25 
             Buy-Sell 0.39 0.37 0.62c 0.39 
 
0.86a 0.52b 0.55b 0.50c 
 
0.22 0.24 0.54 0.35 
Silence-Sell -0.26 -0.70b -0.22 -0.42  -0.34 -0.51a -0.33 -0.31  -0.23 -0.76c -0.22 -0.42 
 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the 
positives and two equal groups for the negatives; for net stock issues we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups for the 
negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. We retain the short legs only. Within the firms in the 
short legs we further form portfolios based on their net insider demand (NID) over the past six months. NID is defined in equation (1). 
Firms with past positive, non-positive, and missing NID form the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. We also form 
the spread portfolios between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ and between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios. Following the formation of each 
portfolio, we form calendar time equal- and value-weight portfolios of the stock returns over a three-month period and regress the 
excess returns on the Fama and French (1993) three factors and retain the intercepts as the average monthly alpha for the three-month 
period. We estimate average alphas for the four three-month periods following portfolio formation. The analyses are conducted for all 
firms in the short legs (Market), microcap firms (Micro), and all-but-micro firms (ABM), respectively. Microcap and ABM firms are 
separated by the 20
th
 NYSE size percentile. The five anomaly variables and BHAR are defined in the Appendix. Superscripts a, b, and 






Table 4: Insider trading activity measured during alternative periods  
Panel A: Insider trading activity measured over the prior 12 months 
  Market   Micro   ABM 
  Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
Sort on Net Stock Issues, NS 
Silence 105 -1.37a -7.32a -13.01a 
 
79 -1.48a -7.58a -13.82a 
 
27 -1.22a -7.13a -11.59a 
Buy 108 -0.32b -1.20c -2.11 
 
76 -0.43b -1.61c -2.83c 
 
33 -0.21 -0.66 -0.77 
Sell 265 -0.52a -3.37a -6.09a 
 
121 -0.79a -4.76a -9.02a 
 
144 -0.30b -2.22a -3.68a 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.20 2.17a 3.98a 
  
0.36c 3.15a 6.19a 
  
0.10 1.56 2.91 
  
[1.46] [3.45] [3.11] 
  
[1.80] [4.24] [4.73] 
  
[0.48] [1.35] [1.27] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.85a -3.95a -6.92a 
  
-0.69a -2.82a -4.80a 
  
-0.92a -4.91a -7.91a 
   [-4.76] [-5.88] [-5.18]   [-2.85] [-3.64] [-3.71]   [-3.51] [-3.73] [-2.99] 
Sort on Momentum, Mom 
Silence 225 -1.42a -5.95a -7.44a 
 
178 -1.59a -6.58a -8.12a 
 
47 -0.91a -3.89b -4.98 
Buy 254 -0.29 -1.18 0.13 
 
186 -0.44b -1.63c -0.30 
 
68 0.02 -0.13 1.04 
Sell 420 -0.45b -1.92b -0.83 
 
228 -0.80a -2.94a -2.13 
 
191 -0.13 -0.79 0.73 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.16 0.74 0.96 
  
0.36a 1.31b 1.83c 
  
0.15 0.66 0.31 
  
[1.44] [1.59] [0.94] 
  
[2.80] [2.15] [1.66] 
  
[0.94] [0.97] [0.25] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.97a -4.03a -6.62a 
  
-0.79a -3.64a -5.99a 
  
-0.78a -3.10a -5.71b 
   [-6.74] [-7.62] [-5.01]   [-5.04] [-6.36] [-4.79]   [-3.63] [-2.99] [-2.42] 
Sort on Accruals, Ac/B 
Silence 116 -1.05a -5.25a -8.78a 
 
95 -1.19a -5.86a -9.67a 
 
21 -0.60a -2.86a -5.01b 
Buy 118 0.16 0.14 0.10 
 
92 0.15 0.06 0.08 
 
26 0.14 0.07 -0.71 
Sell 248 -0.29a -1.77a -2.39b 
 
135 -0.57a -3.25a -5.18a 
 
112 0.02 -0.15 0.79 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.45a 1.91a 2.48c 
  
0.72a 3.32a 5.27a 
  
0.11 0.22 -1.50 
  
[3.22] [2.75] [1.86] 
  
[4.04] [3.53] [2.82] 
  
[0.47] [0.21] [-0.66] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.77a -3.48a -6.40a 
  
-0.62a -2.61a -4.48a 
  
-0.62a -2.71a -5.80b 
   [-5.34] [-5.06] [-4.42]   [-3.32] [-3.09] [-2.73]   [-2.80] [-2.61] [-2.25] 
Sort on Asset Growth, dA/A 
Silence 83 -1.30a -6.50a -10.48a 
 
58 -1.43a -7.16a -11.67a 
 
25 -0.98a -4.41a -6.49a 
Buy 87 -0.43a -3.15a -4.11a 
 
58 -0.58a -3.85a -4.89a 
 
29 -0.26 -2.17b -3.11c 
Sell 280 -0.46a -2.59a -2.89b 
 
111 -0.77a -4.30a -6.06a 
 
169 -0.25c -1.44b -0.80 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.03 -0.56 -1.21 
  
0.20 0.46 1.16 
  
-0.01 -0.74 -2.31 
  
[0.17] [-0.95] [-0.88] 
  
[1.07] [0.52] [0.71] 
  
[-0.03] [-0.82] [-1.21] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.84a -3.92a -7.59a 
  
-0.65a -2.86a -5.61a 
  
-0.73a -2.97b -5.69b 
   [-5.11] [-5.61] [-4.68]   [-3.18] [-3.74] [-3.50]   [-2.68] [-2.52] [-2.31] 
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Sort on Profitability, Y/B 
Silence 169 -1.11a -5.59a -9.33a 
 
144 -1.11a -5.58a -9.10a 
 
24 -1.01a -4.71b -9.09a 
Buy 161 0.14 1.13 2.29 
 
134 0.13 1.41 2.87 
 
27 0.13 -0.15 0.04 
Sell 231 -0.41b -2.09c -3.09 
 
149 -0.45b -2.39b -3.96c 
 
82 -0.26 -1.00 -0.76 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.55a 3.21a 5.38a 
  
0.59a 3.80a 6.83a 
  
0.39 0.85 0.80 
  
[3.64] [4.30] [3.88] 
  
[3.50] [4.48] [4.25] 
  
[1.33] [0.65] [0.30] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.70a -3.51a -6.24a 
  
-0.66a -3.19a -5.14a 
  
-0.76b -3.71a -8.33a 
   [-3.91] [-5.31] [-3.76]   [-3.04] [-4.08] [-2.89]   [-2.55] [-2.97] [-3.31] 
 
Panel B: Insider trading activity measured over the prior three months  
  Market   Micro   ABM 
  Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m   Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
Sort on Net Stock Issues, NS 
Silence 253 -0.88a -5.02a -8.66a 
 
169 -1.10a -5.72a -9.96a 
 
84 -0.50a -3.53a -6.20a 
Buy 67 0.07 -0.66 -1.81c 
 
42 -0.11 -1.03 -2.88b 
 
25 0.25 0.13 0.36 
Sell 159 -0.55a -3.01a -5.55a 
 
65 -0.83a -4.44a -8.44a 
 
94 -0.36b -1.94a -3.34a 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.62a 2.35a 3.74a 
  
0.73b 3.41a 5.57a 
  
0.60b 2.07c 3.70c 
  
[2.72] [3.02] [3.38] 
  
[2.38] [2.79] [3.34] 
  
[2.09] [1.84] [1.96] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.33b -2.01a -3.11a 
  
-0.27 -1.28 -1.52 
  
-0.14 -1.59b -2.86c 
   [-2.39] [-3.58] [-2.98]   [-1.20] [-1.37] [-0.93]   [-0.80] [-2.00] [-1.87] 
Sort on Momentum, Mom 
Silence 536 -0.81a -3.67a -3.96b 
 
384 -1.10a -4.42a -4.88a 
 
152 -0.31 -1.95c -1.76 
Buy 175 0.18 -0.39 1.25 
 
116 0.01 -0.79 0.94 
 
58 0.42c 0.23 1.44 
Sell 188 -0.77a -1.65c -0.01 
 
92 -1.24a -2.66a -1.09 
 
96 -0.33 -0.49 1.49 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.95a 1.27b 1.26 
  
1.25a 1.87c 2.03 
  
0.76a 0.72 -0.05 
  
[6.94] [1.98] [0.79] 
  
[5.39] [1.89] [0.99] 
  
[3.95] [1.03] [-0.03] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.05 -2.02a -3.95a 
  
0.14 -1.76b -3.79c 
  
0.03 -1.46b -3.25a 
   [-0.40] [-3.84] [-2.92]   [0.68] [-2.19] [-1.93]   [0.20] [-2.55] [-2.83] 
Sort on Accruals, Ac/B 
Silence 266 -0.59a -3.18a -4.92a 
 
200 -0.78a -3.83a -6.27a 
 
66 -0.16 -1.69b -1.71 
Buy 71 0.59a 1.43c 1.90 
 
50 0.57a 1.16 1.89 
 
21 0.61a 1.63 1.54 
Sell 145 -0.29b -1.51b -2.32c 
 
72 -0.45b -3.07a -5.47a 
 
73 -0.08 -0.03 0.55 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.88a 2.94a 4.22a 
  
1.03a 4.23a 7.35a 
  
0.69a 1.66 0.99 
  
[4.85] [3.62] [2.77] 
  
[4.24] [4.40] [4.09] 
  
[2.65] [1.36] [0.42] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.30b -1.67b -2.60c 
  
-0.32 -0.76 -0.80 
  
-0.08 -1.66b -2.26 
   [-2.09] [-2.46] [-1.80]   [-1.56] [-0.94] [-0.49]   [-0.49] [-1.99] [-1.13] 
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Sort on Asset Growth, dA/A 
Silence 217 -0.79a -4.56a -6.61a 
 
134 -1.08a -5.61a -8.25a 
 
83 -0.37b -2.93a -4.12a 
Buy 60 -0.09 -1.61b -1.99 
 
35 -0.27 -2.41b -2.83 
 
25 0.06 -0.79 -1.18 
Sell 173 -0.52a -2.50a -2.74c 
 
59 -0.89a -4.54a -6.66a 
 
114 -0.34b -1.40c -0.59 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.43b 0.89 0.75 
  
0.61b 2.13c 3.83c 
  
0.40 0.61 -0.59 
  
[2.24] [1.34] [0.52] 
  
[2.36] [1.88] [1.86] 
  
[1.53] [0.62] [-0.34] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.27b -2.06a -3.87a 
  
-0.20 -1.07 -1.59 
  
-0.03 -1.53b -3.53a 
   [-1.99] [-3.23] [-3.22]   [-0.97] [-1.32] [-1.18]   [-0.20] [-2.13] [-2.63] 
Sort on Profitability, Y/B 
Silence 343 -0.74a -3.47a -5.67a 
 
280 -0.81a -3.54a -5.61a 
 
63 -0.38 -2.39 -4.77c 
Buy 81 0.69a 2.02c 4.48c 
 
65 0.81a 2.50b 5.00c 
 
16 0.22 -0.02 2.39 
Sell 135 -0.40c -1.37 -2.47 
 
83 -0.45 -1.33 -3.03 
 
53 -0.36 -0.77 -0.34 
               Buy-Sell 
 
1.09a 3.39a 6.95a 
  
1.27a 3.82a 8.03a 
  
0.58 0.75 2.73 
  
[4.74] [3.81] [4.80] 
  
[4.64] [4.07] [5.13] 
  
[1.55] [0.45] [0.88] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.34b -2.10a -3.20c 
  
-0.35 -2.21b -2.58 
  
-0.03 -1.62 -4.43b 
   [-2.17] [-2.68] [-1.89]   [-1.63] [-2.32] [-1.29]   [-0.12] [-1.58] [-2.02] 
 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the 
positives and two equal groups for the negatives; for net stock issues we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups for the 
negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. We retain the short legs only. Within the firms in the 
short legs we further form portfolios based on their net insider demand (NID) over the past 12 (Panel A) or three (Panel B) months. 
NID is defined in equation (1). Firms with past positive, non-positive, and missing NID form the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ 
portfolios, respectively. For each portfolio we present the time-series average of the equal-weight BHARs over one-, six-, and 12-
month holding periods. The spreads between the portfolios are presented together with their t-statistics in brackets. The analyses are 
based on all (Market), microcap (Micro), and all-but-micro (ABM) firms, respectively. Microcap and ABM firms are separated by the 
20
th
 NYSE size percentile. All tests are based on Newey-West standard errors. The five anomaly variables and BHAR are defined in 
the Appendix. Superscripts a, b, and c represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
 
Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
 
Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
Sort on Net Stock Issues, NS12 
Silence 191 -1.01a -6.18a -11.23a 
 
140 -1.09a -6.86a -12.72a 
 
51 -0.79a -4.43a -7.60a 
Buy 97 -0.12 -1.17c -2.08c 
 
66 -0.11 -0.72 -1.97 
 
31 -0.30 -2.33a -2.36 
Sell 250 -0.58a -3.66a -6.58a 
 
117 -0.79a -5.49a -10.05a 
 
133 -0.38b -2.28a -4.10a 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.46b 2.49a 4.50a 
  
0.68a 4.77a 8.08a 
  
0.08 -0.05 1.74 
  
[2.42] [3.73] [3.76] 
  
[3.10] [3.87] [3.99] 
  
[0.31] [-0.05] [0.91] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.43a -2.52a -4.65a 
  
-0.30 -1.37 -2.67b 
  
-0.41b -2.16b -3.50c 
  
[-2.83] [-3.87] [-4.24] 
  
[-1.34] [-1.36] [-2.02] 
  
[-2.38] [-2.55] [-1.85] 
Sort on Net Stock Issues, NS6 
Silence 184 -0.78a -5.47a -9.88a 
 
137 -0.81a -5.88a -10.96a 
 
47 -0.67a -4.19a -6.86a 
Buy 91 -0.00 -0.74 -1.51 
 
64 0.07 -0.32 -1.22 
 
27 -0.10 -1.31 -2.27 
Sell 266 -0.34c -2.42a -5.12a 
 
129 -0.38c -2.89b -7.35a 
 
138 -0.25 -1.65b -2.94b 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.34c 1.69b 3.60a 
  
0.45c 2.57b 6.13a 
  
0.15 0.34 0.68 
  
[1.80] [2.14] [3.01] 
  
[1.92] [2.29] [3.58] 
  
[0.60] [0.30] [0.36] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.44a -3.05a -4.77a 
  
-0.43b -2.99b -3.60c 
  
-0.42b -2.54a -3.92a 
  
[-3.18] [-4.07] [-3.78] 
  
[-2.09] [-2.45] [-1.91] 
  
[-2.26] [-3.45] [-2.61] 
Sort on Momentum, Mom6 
Silence 327 -0.98a -5.16a -7.30a 
 
244 -1.22a -6.04a -8.49a 
 
83 -0.51b -3.18a -4.52b 
Buy 191 0.02 -1.61c -1.09 
 
127 -0.17 -2.25a -1.87 
 
63 0.24 -0.63 -0.24 
Sell 312 -0.42b -2.60a -2.56b 
 
152 -0.79a -4.07a -4.18a 
 
160 -0.13 -1.27c -0.91 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.44a 0.99c 1.47 
  
0.61a 1.82b 2.31c 
  
0.37c 0.63 0.67 
  
[3.04] [1.76] [1.50] 
  
[3.36] [2.47] [1.86] 
  
[1.89] [0.92] [0.55] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.56a -2.56a -4.74a 
  
-0.43b -1.97a -4.31a 
  
-0.38b -1.91a -3.61a 
  
[-4.61] [-5.75] [-4.56] 
  
[-2.40] [-3.83] [-3.58] 
  




Table 5 (Continued) 
Sort on Asset Growth, AG 
Silence 155 -0.99a -5.26a -8.21a 
 
105 -1.19a -5.93a -9.52a 
 
50 -0.62a -3.73a -5.37a 
Buy 85 -0.20 -2.51a -3.68a 
 
53 -0.34 -3.17a -4.61a 
 
32 -0.08 -1.96b -2.88b 
Sell 238 -0.56a -3.06a -4.02a 
 
91 -0.94a -4.92a -7.77a 
 
147 -0.34b -1.84b -1.61 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.36b 0.56 0.34 
  
0.60a 1.76b 3.17c 
  
0.26 -0.12 -1.28 
  
[2.17] [0.85] [0.26] 
  
[2.75] [1.99] [1.93] 
  
[1.13] [-0.14] [-0.72] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.43a -2.19a -4.19a 
  
-0.25 -1.01 -1.74 
  
-0.28 -1.89b -3.76b 
  
[-3.34] [-3.20] [-2.86] 
  
[-1.35] [-1.28] [-1.21] 
  
[-1.54] [-2.43] [-2.01] 
Sort on Investment, Inv 
Silence 169 -0.82a -3.79a -5.47a 
 
115 -1.04a -4.43a -6.33a 
 
54 -0.40b -2.61a -3.99b 
Buy 98 -0.20 -1.70b -0.82 
 
62 -0.35c -2.24b -0.99 
 
37 0.07 -1.07 -1.09 
Sell 247 -0.33a -1.72a -2.89b 
 
94 -0.62a -3.44a -6.23a 
 
153 -0.13 -0.65 -0.90 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.13 0.02 2.07b 
  
0.26 1.20c 5.24a 
  
0.20 -0.42 -0.19 
  
[0.90] [0.04] [2.48] 
  
[1.36] [1.80] [4.44] 
  
[0.98] [-0.53] [-0.14] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.49a -2.07a -2.57c 
  
-0.43b -1.00 -0.11 
  
-0.26 -1.96b -3.09c 
  
[-3.83] [-3.11] [-1.82] 
  
[-2.37] [-1.01] [-0.05] 
  
[-1.55] [-2.44] [-1.74] 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for asset growth and investment we form five quintiles for the positives and two equal 
groups for the negatives; for NS12 and NS6 we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups for the negatives, and a group 
for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. The sample includes the short legs only. Within the firms in the short legs we 
further form portfolios based on their net insider demand (NID) over the past six months. NID is defined in equation (1). Firms with 
past positive, non-positive, and missing NID form the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. For each portfolio we 
present the time-series average of the equal-weight BHARs over one-, six-, and 12-month holding periods. The spreads between the 
portfolios are presented together with their t-statistics in brackets. The analyses are based on all (Market), microcap (Micro), and all-
but-micro (ABM) firms, respectively. Microcap and ABM firms are separated by the 20
th
 NYSE size percentile. All tests are based on 
Newey-West standard errors. The five anomaly variables and BHAR are defined in the Appendix. Superscripts a, b, and c represent 





Table 6: Institutional ownership, analysts following, and volatility, and insider silence 
Anomalies   1 m  6 m 12 m   1 m  6 m 12 m   1 m  6 m 12 m 
    Low IO   High IO   T(High - Low) 
Net Stock Issues 
 
-1.65a -8.77a -13.95a 
 
-0.71a -3.44a -6.49a 
 
[3.45] [4.66] [2.98] 
Momentum 
 
-1.46a -6.14a -7.99a 
 
-0.85a -3.77a -5.04a 
 
[2.77] [2.85] [1.72] 
Accruals 
 
-0.95a -6.05a -9.23a 
 
-0.56a -3.17a -6.05a 
 
[1.37] [3.21] [1.63] 
Asset Growth 
 
-1.21a -6.61a -9.97a 
 
-0.74a -3.83a -5.85b 
 
[1.87] [3.22] [1.82] 
Profitability  -1.68a -8.31a -14.30a  -0.48b -1.90 -4.85c  [4.35] [4.51] [3.09] 
    Few analysts   Many analysts   T(Many - Few) 
Net Stock Issues 
 
-1.20a -6.30a -10.90a 
 
-0.67a -3.99a -6.84a 
 
[2.39] [2.41] [2.39] 
Momentum 
 
-1.02a -4.45a -5.57a 
 
-0.88a -4.15a -4.49a 
 
[0.48] [0.34] [0.62] 
Accruals 
 
-0.73a -4.32a -7.62a 
 
-0.45b -2.28a -2.92b 
 
[0.92] [2.01] [2.54] 
Asset Growth 
 
-1.07a -5.50a -10.03a 
 
-1.00a -4.51a -5.53a 
 
[0.36] [1.05] [2.40] 
Profitability  -0.89a -5.45a -10.76a  -0.28 -1.36 -2.07  [1.62] [2.32] [3.08] 
    High volatility   Low volatility   T(Low - High) 
Net Stock Issues 
 
-1.65a -8.46a -13.90a 
 
-0.74a -4.00a -7.41a 
 
[2.21] [2.53] [1.94] 
Momentum 
 
-1.70a -6.23a -6.82b 
 
-0.61a -3.83a -5.14a 
 
[3.73] [1.39] [0.54] 
Accruals 
 
-0.89a -4.99a -7.40a 
 
-0.56a -3.75a -6.18a 
 
[1.02] [0.77] [0.39] 
Asset Growth 
 
-1.70a -7.43a -10.76a 
 
-0.57a -3.62a -5.80a 
 
[3.15] [1.87] [1.43] 
Profitability  -1.19a -5.40a -10.95a  -0.77a -3.07a -5.16a  [1.05] [1.46] [1.85] 
 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the 
positives and two equal groups for the negatives; for net stock issues we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups for the 
negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. We retain firms in the short legs whose insiders do not 
trade over the past six months. We then sort these firms into microcap (below the 20
th





 NYSE size percentiles), and large (above the 50
th
 NYSE size percentile) and within each size group we sort firms into terciles 
by each variable (IO, Analysts, and Volatility). These terciles are then pooled across the size groups. For firms in the terciles we 
calculate the time-series average of the equal-weight BHARs over the one-, six-, and 12-month holding periods. The three variables 
(IO, Analysts, and Volatility) and the five anomaly variables are all defined in the Appendix. The table reports the BHARs for the two 
extreme terciles and the t-statistics testing equal means between the two extreme groups. All tests are based on Newey-West standard 




Table 7: Insider silence and litigation risk 
 
Anomalies   1 m  6 m 12 m   1 m  6 m 12 m 
 
  Low litigation risk   High litigation risk 
Net Stock Issues   -0.88a -5.19a -9.18a   -1.28a -7.82a -14.04a 
Momentum   -1.01a -3.94a -5.35a   -1.13a -5.04a -5.49b 
Accruals   -0.73a -3.17a -5.49b   -0.65a -4.51a -7.27a 
Asset Growth   -0.65a -4.25a -6.88a   -1.32a -7.20a -10.48a 
Profitability   -0.84a -3.76a -6.83a   -0.89a -4.63a -7.26b 
 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the 
positives and two equal groups for the negatives; for net stock issues we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups for the 
negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. We retain firms in the short legs whose insiders do not 
trade over the past six months. We then sort these firms into two groups on their measure of litigation risk (Kim and Skinner, 2012). 
For each portfolio we calculate the time-series average of the equal-weight BHARs over the one-, six-, and 12-month holding periods. 
The five anomaly variables and the measure of litigation risk (KS) are all defined in the Appendix. All tests are based on Newey-West 




Table 8: Regulated insider trading and the long legs of the anomalies 
  Market   Micro   ABM 
 
Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
 
Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
 
Avg. N 1 m 6 m 12 m 
Sort on Net Stock Issues, NS 
Silence 123 -0.07 -0.41 -1.32 
 
79 -0.12 -0.56 -1.75 
 
44 -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 
Buy 64 0.27c 1.49 3.19b 
 
36 0.24 1.49 4.14b 
 
28 0.26 0.94 0.76 
Sell 179 0.07 0.34 1.00 
 
53 -0.04 -0.52 -0.10 
 
126 0.14 0.73 1.63 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.20 1.15 2.19 
  
0.28 2.00 4.24c 
  
0.12 0.21 -0.87 
  
[1.25] [1.16] [1.28] 
  
[1.16] [1.47] [1.72] 
  
[0.68] [0.21] [-0.51] 
Silence-Buy 
 
-0.34b -1.90b -4.51a 
  
-0.36c -2.05 -5.88b 
  
-0.27 -0.94 -0.90 
  
[-2.14] [-2.12] [-2.74] 
  
[-1.69] [-1.64] [-2.19] 
  
[-1.36] [-1.15] [-0.65] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.14 -0.74 -2.32c 
  
-0.08 -0.05 -1.64 
  
-0.15 -0.74 -1.78 
   [-1.28] [-1.20] [-1.84]   [-0.43] [-0.05] [-0.92]   [-1.15] [-1.06] [-1.31] 
Sort on Momentum, Mom 
Silence 231 0.33 -0.13 -3.40c 
 
176 0.42c 0.01 -3.67c 
 
56 0.20 -0.53 -2.71 
Buy 90 1.19a 4.05a 4.80b 
 
68 1.51a 5.30a 6.36b 
 
22 0.43c 0.30 0.58 
Sell 416 0.37c 0.89 0.87 
 
188 0.41 0.03 -1.11 
 
229 0.37 1.44 2.27 
             Buy-Sell 
 
0.82a 3.16a 3.93a 
  
1.09a 5.26a 7.47a 
  
0.06 -1.14 -1.69 
  
[5.66] [4.78] [3.24] 
  
[5.77] [7.21] [6.73] 
  
[0.25] [-1.26] [-0.96] 
Silence-Buy 
 
-0.86a -4.18a -8.20a 
  
-1.09a -5.29a -10.03a 
  
-0.23 -0.83 -3.29b 
  
[-5.65] [-6.37] [-6.85] 
  
[-6.18] [-6.12] [-5.86] 
  
[-0.94] [-0.84] [-2.27] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.04 -1.02b -4.27a 
  
0.00 -0.03 -2.56 
  
-0.17 -1.97a -4.98a 
   [-0.31] [-2.03] [-3.19]   [0.01] [-0.04] [-1.55]   [-1.11] [-3.45] [-4.21] 
Sort on Accruals, Ac/B 
Silence 297 -0.30a -1.26c -2.76b 
 
225 -0.37a -1.53b -3.23b 
 
72 -0.06 -0.24 -1.29 
Buy 152 0.32a 0.87 3.16b 
 
108 0.28c 0.65 3.20c 
 
44 0.42a 1.17c 3.06a 
Sell 328 -0.04 -0.21 -0.26 
 
145 -0.21 -1.13 -2.37c 
 
183 0.09 0.51 1.45 
               Buy-Sell 
 
0.36a 1.08 3.42a 
  
0.49a 1.78b 5.56a 
  
0.33c 0.66 1.61 
  
[2.82] [1.60] [2.85] 
  
[2.84] [2.52] [3.70] 
  
[1.90] [0.69] [0.95] 
Silence-Buy 
 
-0.62a -2.14a -5.92a 
  
-0.64a -2.18a -6.42a 
  
-0.48b -1.41 -4.34a 
  
[-4.44] [-3.03] [-4.93] 
  
[-3.89] [-2.75] [-4.14] 
  
[-2.52] [-1.42] [-2.70] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.26b -1.06a -2.50a 
  
-0.16 -0.40 -0.86 
  
-0.14 -0.75 -2.73b 
   [-2.42] [-2.74] [-2.99]   [-1.00] [-0.71] [-1.31]   [-0.96] [-1.22] [-2.24] 
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Sort on Growth of Assets, dA/A 
Silence 264 -0.44a -1.77c -3.82a 
 
216 -0.54a -1.87c -3.82b 
 
48 -0.21 -1.45c -3.79b 
Buy 130 0.47a 2.02a 4.21b 
 
101 0.49a 1.97b 4.49c 
 
29 0.39c 1.96b 2.51 
Sell 214 -0.03 -0.31 -0.68 
 
121 -0.08 -0.78 -1.60 
 
93 -0.01 0.26 0.54 
             Buy-Sell 
 
0.50a 2.34a 4.89a 
  
0.57b 2.75a 6.09a 
  
0.39c 1.70 1.97 
  
[2.84] [3.10] [3.68] 
  
[2.50] [2.76] [3.53] 
  
[1.76] [1.55] [0.79] 
Silence-Buy 
 
-0.91a -3.79a -8.03a 
  
-1.03a -3.85a -8.32a 
  
-0.60b -3.41a -6.30a 
  
[-5.69] [-5.40] [-6.12] 
  
[-5.76] [-5.14] [-5.37] 
  
[-2.59] [-3.57] [-3.43] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.41a -1.46a -3.14b 
  
-0.46b -1.10 -2.23 
  
-0.20 -1.71b -4.33b 
   [-2.93] [-3.03] [-2.01]   [-2.35] [-1.61] [-1.09]   [-1.20] [-2.22] [-2.07] 
Sort on Profitability, Y/B 
Silence 118 -0.01 -1.00 -1.55 
 
68 -0.04 -2.06 -3.23 
 
51 -0.03 -0.04 0.08 
Buy 63 0.31 0.60 1.26 
 
33 0.29 0.26 0.45 
 
30 0.24 0.70 1.77 
Sell 235 0.11 0.48 1.41 
 
63 -0.18 -1.71 -2.98 
 
173 0.21c 1.15c 2.72b 
             Buy-Sell 
 
0.19 0.12 -0.15 
  
0.47c 1.97c 3.43c 
  
0.04 -0.45 -0.95 
  
[1.16] [0.14] [-0.10] 
  
[1.92] [1.71] [1.76] 
  
[0.19] [-0.44] [-0.48] 
Silence-Buy 
 
-0.32c -1.61b -2.81c 
  
-0.34 -2.32b -3.68c 
  
-0.27 -0.74 -1.69 
  
[-1.87] [-2.05] [-1.90] 
  
[-1.39] [-2.09] [-1.94] 
  
[-1.31] [-0.72] [-1.00] 
Silence-Sell 
 
-0.12 -1.49b -2.96b 
  
0.14 -0.35 -0.25 
  
-0.24c -1.19c -2.64b 
   [-0.99] [-2.47] [-2.56]   [0.63] [-0.39] [-0.17]   [-1.68] [-1.81] [-1.99] 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the 
positives and two equal groups for the negatives; for net stock issues we form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups for the 
negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. We retain the long legs only. Within the firms in the 
long legs we further form portfolios based on their net insider demand (NID) over the past six months. NID is defined in equation (1). 
Firms with past positive, non-positive, and missing NID form the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. For each 
portfolio we present the time-series average of the equal-weight BHARs over one-, six-, and 12-month holding periods. The spreads 
between the ―buy‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios and between the ―silence‖ and ―sell‖ portfolios are also presented, together with their Newey-
West t-statistics in brackets. The analyses are conducted for all firms in the long legs (Market), microcap firms (Micro), and all-but-
micro firms (ABM), respectively. Microcap and ABM firms are separated by the 20
th
 NYSE size percentile. All tests are based on 
Newey-West standard errors. The five anomaly variables and BHAR are defined in the Appendix. Superscripts a, b, and c represent 




Figure 1: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) of insider trading portfolios in the short leg of net stock issues  
Panel A: Market 
 
Panel B: Microcap 
 
 
Panel C: All but microcap 
 
 
The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from 
January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on net stock 
issues. We form five quintiles for the positives, two equal groups 
for the negatives, and a group for the zeros. The breakpoints are 
based on ABM firms. We retain the short legs only. Within firms in 
the short legs we further form portfolios based on their net insider 
demand (NID) over the past six months. NID is defined in equation 
(1). Firms with positive, non-positive, and missing NID form the 
―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. For each 
portfolio we present the time-series average of the equal-weight 
BHARs (in %) over the holding periods of one to 12 months. 
Panels A, B, and C are based on all firms in the short legs (Market), 
microcap (Micro), and all-but-micro firms (ABM), respectively. 
Microcap and ABM firms are separated by the 20
th
 NYSE size 
percentile. The anomaly variable (net stock issues) is defined in the 
















































































































The sample covers NYSE/Amex/NASDAQ common stocks from January 1990 to December 2010. We sort stocks on each anomaly 
variable. For momentum we form five quintiles; for profitability, growth of assets, and accruals we form five quintiles for the 
positives and two equal groups for the negatives. The breakpoints are based on ABM firms. For firms within the short legs we further 
form portfolios based on their net insider demand (NID) over the past six months. NID is defined in equation (1). Firms with past 
positive, non-positive, and missing NID form the ―buy,‖ ―sell,‖ and ―silence‖ portfolios, respectively. For each portfolio we present 
the time-series average of the equal-weight BHARs (in %) over a holding period of one to 12 months. The anomaly variables and 










The data sources are the Center for Research in security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, 
Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed, I/B/E/S, and Thomson 13f institutional ownership 
database. Following Fama and French (2008) we measure the anomaly variables by June of year 
t to forecast the returns in July of t to June of t+1. The exception is momentum, which is updated 
every month. Time t in Compustat refers to fiscal year end in calendar year t. The main variables 
are defined below. 
 
Firm characteristics  
MC: Market capitalization, the natural log of price times number of shares outstanding at 
the end of June of year t, from CRSP. 
B/M: Book to market ratio, the natural log of the ratio of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity. Book value B is total assets (Compustat item AT) for year t-
1, minus liabilities (LT), plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit 
(TXDIC) if available, minus preferred stock liquidating value (PSTKL) if available, 
or redemption value (PSTKRV) if available, or carrying value (PSTK). Market 
value M is price times share outstanding at the end of December of t-1, from CRSP.  
 
Anomaly variables 
NS: Net stock issues, the natural log of the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the fiscal 
year end in t-1 minus the natural log of the split-adjusted shares outstanding at the 
fiscal year end in t-2. The split-adjusted shares outstanding is CSHO times AJEX in 
Compustat. 
Mom: Momentum, the buy-and-hold return from month j-12 to j-2, where j-1 is the month 
of portfolio formation and j is the first month of forecasted stock returns. This 
variable is monthly rebalanced. 
Ac/B: Accruals, the change in operating working capital per share (split-adjusted) from 
fiscal year t-2 to t-1, divided by book equity per share (split-adjusted) in year t-1. 
Operating working capital is current assets (Compustat item ACT) minus cash and 
short-term investment (CHE) minus current liabilities (LCT) plus debt in current 
liabilities (DLC).  
dA/A: Growth in assets, the natural log of assets per share (split-adjusted) at the fiscal year 
end in t-1, minus the natural log of assets per share (split-adjusted) at the fiscal year 
end in t-2.  
Y/B: Profitability, equity income (IB), minus dividends on preferred (DVP), if available, 
plus income statement deferred taxes (TXDI), if available of fiscal year end in t-1, 
normalized by book value of equity in fiscal year t-1.  
 
Anomaly variables (alternative definitions) 
NS12: Net stock issues over the past 12 months, the natural log of the split-adjusted shares 
outstanding in month j-1 minus the natural log of the split-adjusted shares 
outstanding in month j-12, where j-1 is the month of portfolio formation and j is the 
first month of forecasted stock returns. 
NS6: Net stock issues over the past 6 months, the natural log of the split-adjusted shares 
outstanding in month j-1 minus the natural log of the split-adjusted shares 
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outstanding in month j-6, where j-1 is the month of portfolio formation and j is the 
first month of forecasted stock returns. 
Mom6: Momentum over the past six months, the buy-and-hold return from month j-6 to j-2, 
where j-1 is the month of portfolio formation and j is the first month of forecasted 
stock returns. This variable is monthly rebalanced. 
Inv: Investment, the annual change in gross property, plant, and equipment (PPEGT of 
fiscal year t-1 minus PPEGT of fiscal year t-2) plus the annual change in inventories 
(INVT of fiscal year t-1 minus INVT of fiscal year t-2) scaled by the lagged book 
value of assets (AT of fiscal year t-2). 
AG: Asset growth, the natural log of total assets (AT) at the fiscal year end in t-1, minus 
the natural log of assets (AT) at the fiscal year end in t-2. 
 
Insider trading variable 
NID: Net insider demand, NID of month j is defined as the number of shares that insiders 
buy minus the number of shares that insiders sell over the past six months, 
normalized by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of month j-1. For 
robustness we also vary the measuring window from one month to 12 months. 
 
Information environment and limits to arbitrage variables 
IO: Institutional ownership, the percentage owned by institutional shareholders as of the 
most recent quarter end.  
Analysts: Number of analysts following the stock as of the most recent month end. Missing 
value is set to zero. 
Volatility: Standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the past 52 weeks.  
 
Return variable 
BHAR: We construct buy–and–hold abnormal return (BHAR) in a way similar to the recent 
literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Sias and Whidbee, 2010). Specifically, at 
the end of June of year t, we independently form NYSE size and book–to–market 
(B/M) quintiles to extract the breakpoint values, and assign AMEX and NASDAQ 
stocks to the 5 x 5 portfolios according to their size and B/M values. The equal–
weight portfolio return serves as the benchmark return for the stock in the same size 
and B/M portfolio for the months starting from July of year t to June of year t+1. 
Portfolio assignment is rebalanced every year. BHAR for stock j is defined as the 
buy–and–hold raw return of stock j minus the buy–and–hold benchmark portfolio 
return. If a stock is delisted before the holding period, returns of the months after 
delisting are replaced with the benchmark portfolio returns. The delisting return is 
used for the delisting month. We calculate BHAR for all stocks/months over the 








KS: KS is based on Model 3 in Table 7 of Kim and Skinner (2012, page 302). 
KS=  
 
FPS * 0.566  
+ LNASSETS * 0.518  
+ SALES_GROWTH * 0.982  
+ RETURN * 0.379  
+ SKEWNESS * (–0.108)  
+ STDDEV * 25.635  
+ TURNOVER*0.00007/1000,  
where the right–hand–side variables are defined below. 
 
FPS: equal to 1 if the firm is in the biotech (SIC codes 2833–2836 and 8731–8734), 
computer (3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics (3600–3674), or retail (5200–
5961) industry, and 0 otherwise. 
LNASSETS: Natural log of total assets at the end of year t–1; 
SALES_GROWTH: Year t–1 sales less year t–2 sales scaled by beginning of year t–
1 total assets; 
RETURN: Market–adjusted 12–month stock return. The accumulation period ends 
with year t–1 fiscal year–end month; 
SKEWNESS:  Skewness of the firm’s 12–month return for year t–1; 
STDDEV: Standard deviation of the firm’s 12–month returns for year t–1; 
TURNOVER: Trading volume accumulated over the 12–month period ending with 
the fiscal year–end before year t–1 fiscal year–end month scaled by beginning of 
year t–1 shares outstanding. 
 
